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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioner, Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Weber Memorial"), was a provider of long-term health 
care in Ogden, Utah. Chartham Management, Inc. was the management 
corporation which operates the Weber Memorial Care Center. A 
number of the patients of Weber Memorial qualified for Medicaid 
assistance, and under the state-administered Medicaid system, 
Weber Memorial was reimbursed by the Stae Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, which was the Defendant 
Appellee herein. After some four years of litigation the 
Petitioner still has not had its opportunity to put on evidence 
which would tend to show the Utah Medicaid Plan is not in 
compliance with federal law. 
In 1981 the State of Utah adopted a "flat-rate" system 
for reimbursing providers. Under this system, all long-term 
health care providers are paid a single rate per patient, per day 
for "intermediate" and "skilled" patients. Regardless of costs, 
the provider is reimbursed according to the flat rate set by the 
Department. If costs, no matter how unavoidable, exceed the flat 
rate, the provider must operate at a deficit. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13(A), the so-called "Boren 
Amendment," instructs states participating in the Medicaid program 
to pay health care providers through the use of rates which are 
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"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred 
by efficiently and economically operated facilities." These 
facilities operate in a heavily regulated environment, and, as the 
Boren Amendment also directs, the rates must take into account the 
costs associated with compliance with "applicable state and 
federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards . • . 
insur[ing] that individuals eligible for assistance have reason-
able access (taking into account geographical location and 
reasonable travel time), • • ." Id. See, also, Hillhaven Corp. 
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, 634 F.Supp. 1313, 1315 (E.D. Wis. 
1986). 
Weber Memorial was purchased from Weber County in 1981. 
When that purchase occurred, the facility became a privately-held 
asset. With private ownership came burdens not associated with 
public ownership by Weber County. Property taxes now had to be 
paid and additions to the physicial plant such as a sprinkler 
system had to be made. In spite of these additional costs, good 
management brought the overall cost down, accomplished by respon-
sible reductions in staff, centralization of support functions and 
economies in purchasing. Despite significant efforts to reduce 
costs, including staff reductions etc., the costs of complying 
with Medicaid standards of patient care and safety exceeded the 
flat rate. 
At all times, Weber Memorial contended, as it still 
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does, that it was and is an efficiently and economically operated 
facility. Therefore, Weber Memorial requested a hearing under the 
rule promulgated by the Department, in order to contest the 
operation of the Utah Medicaid System. 
Weber Memorial made its request for hearing on July 28, 
1983. The administrative hearing finally commenced on August 3, 
1984, over a year after it was originally requested. Pursuant to a 
hearing officer's ruling, Weber Memorial was never permitted to 
introduce evidence of its costs or to prove, as it was prepared 
to, that it is an efficiently and economically operated facility 
within the meaning of the federal statute. 
On May 20, 1985, nearly two years after the request for 
hearing was submitted, the hearing officer issued his Proposed 
Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. The Executive 
Director adopted the findings on June 4, 1985. Weber Memorial 
appealed the decision to the District Court, which issued its 
opinion affirming the hearing officer on June 3, 1986 (Memorandum 
Opinion, J. Fishier), followed by a Final Judgment entered August 
4, 1986 by Judge Daniels. Thereafter, an appeal was filed. This 
Petition is brought following the decision of the Court of Appeals 
which erroneously upheld the decision of the District Court. This 
petition raises important federal/state issues never before 
answered by this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE UTAH STATE MEDICAID PLAN FAILS TO COMPLY 
WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE INVALID 
The Appellant, Weber Memorial Care Center, was a 
provider of Medicaid services within the State of Utah and, as 
such, is subject to both state and federal regulations due to its 
participation in the Medicaid program, and has done its best to 
comply with all relevant rules and regulations at both the state 
and federal levels since the commencement of its operation. 
During this appellate process the facility has been sold but the 
property right remains. 
Weber Memorial accepted patients who qualify for medical 
assistance under the Utah State Plan which was filed pursuant to 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act with the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. The Department of Health of the State of Utah 
refused to pay a fair and legally required rate of reimbursement 
to Weber Memorial for care rendered to the said patients. As 
already pointed out, the federal statute underlying the federal 
Medicaid regulations is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A). The 
statute, as well as the federal regulations, are set forth in the 
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Appendix in full (Appendix-1). The regulations, of course, 
reiterate the requirement set forth in the statute that rates must 
be "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be 
incurred by efficiently and economically operated providers to 
provide services in conformity with applicable State and Federal 
laws, regulations and quality and safety standards." (Emphasis 
added.) 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1). The State is required to make 
"findings" that "the rates used to reimburse providers satisfy the 
requirements of the regulations." Id. at 447.253(b). After these 
"findings" are completed, the State must then make and submit 
"assurances" to the federal government that the requirements of 
the statute, as well as "all other parts of [the regulations]" are 
being met. Ix[. at 447.253(a). The State's Plan, which must be 
formulated pursuant to the statute and regulations mentioned 
above, must incorporate the affirmative requirements of the 
statute and regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 447.252. 
In this case, the hearing officer, as well as the 
District Court and Court of Appeals apparently glossed over the 
requirement of "findings" and "assurances" in connection with a 
state plan. Apparently, because the State did submit assurances 
which were accepted by the federal government, the hearing officer 
failed to look beyond the surface at those assurances in order to 
determine whether or not they were supported by "substantive 
findings" and therefore had a basis in fact. 
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The regulations implementing the federal Medicaid 
statutes require that the state medicaid agency must find that the 
rates to reimburse providers satisfy the requirements of law, 
i.e., that the rates "are reasonable and adequate to meet the 
costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated facilities." 42 C.F.R. § 447.250(a). As the record in 
this matter is reviewed, it becomes clear that the Department of 
Health of the State of Utah has not made findings sufficient to 
provide assurances to the Department of Health and Human Services, 
(hereinafter "HHS"), of compliance with federal law. In fact, no 
findings at all have been made by the Secretary or the State of 
Utah relative to what methodology will meet the federal 
requirements. As the deposition of Vaughn Emmett, Director of the 
Bureau of Program Review, Department of Health, State of Utah, 
indicates, there have been no studies conducted by the Department 
of Health that have examined any provider in the state to 
determine whether such providers are efficiently and economically 
operated. All of this was neatly ignored by the hearing officer 
and lower courts. 
In Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex, 1983) 
the District Court granted the provider's motion for a preliminary 
injunction, in part, for the reason that the state rate setters 
failed to examine actual costs and provider efficiencies. 
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From all that appears to this Court . . . [the 
state] never sought to ascertain, and thus never 
knew, even the approximate extent of provision of 
unnecesary services or of provider inefficiency. 
No attempt was made to go outside of provider 
cost reports in an effort to determine the extent 
or nature of unnecessary services; admittedly, 
the state] undertook no independent study of any 
acility's provision of services, or its economy 
and efficiency, nor did it attempt to determine 
in any manner what the cost of a required service 
should be. 
(Emphasis added). _Id_. at 906. Similarly, the Court found that 
the rate-setters failed to "ascertain whether facilities within 
the same level of care indeed had a similar "mix" of residents 
before choosing to rely upon the Department of Health's certifica-
tion as its primary basis for determining adequacy of reimburse-
ment rates.11 I_d_. In the context of this case, the records will 
likewise reflect the Department's failure to conduct any 
"independent study of any facility's provision of services, or its 
economy and efficiency", nor did it examine the "costs" of any 
services at Weber Memorial or any other particular facility. 
Additionally, as discussed in Section III below, the special "mix" 
of residents at Weber Memorial, or other facilities for that 
matter, was in no way considered in the rate-setting process. 
As the Court in Thomas v. Johnston found, such a "manner" of 
adopting the "reimbursement rate structure was arbitrary, 
capricious, and in violation of federal law." Id. at 904. 
Other cases are similar: e.g. In Nebraska Health Care 
Association v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1985) cert. 
* 
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denied, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 947 (1987); Hillhaven Corp. v. 
Wisconsin Dept. of Health, 634 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 (E.D. Wis. 
1986). 
Federal law also requires that methods and standards be 
developed by the State in devising a remibursement system. 42 
C.R.F. § 447.252(b). However, in this case, there was no testing, 
nor were any standards or methods established by Utah regarding 
the efficiency or economy of services provided. Instead, based 
upon conversations with some heatlh care providers, legislators, 
and otherw sith an interest in the matter, the State established a 
budget-oriented, flat-rate reimbursement system. There was never 
a substantive finding by the State of Utah that "the rates to 
reimburse the providers satisfy the requirement" of the regula-
tions or 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(A). 
As the Court in Thomas v. Johnston, supra, pointed out: 
The statute clearly and expressly leaves room for 
states to cut unnecessary costs in a wide variety 
of ways. On the other hand, however, it mani-
festly imposes a substantive limitation on state 
governmental action -- that rates determined by 
Medicaid agencies must be high enough to compen-
sate efficiently and economically operated 
providers for costs necessarily incurred in 
providing the type of care for their residents 
that conforms to all applicable state and federal 
laws and requirements . . . . As stated above, 
under this standard, state Medicaid agencies are 
free to deny providers compensation for provi-
sions of unnecessary services. Likewise, the 
states are not required to pay all costs incurred 
by providers that are not operating efficiently 
PF.TTTION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI - 8 
and economically. Thus, states not only have a 
great deal of flexibility in selecting the 
methods by which rates will be determined, but 
are also accorded freedom to decide what costs 
are necessary or unnecessary, and to determine 
whether and which providers are operating 
efficiently and economically. In addition the 
development of the Medicaid Act and the evolution 
of the reimbursement system away from Medicare 
principles or reimbusement make it clear that 
states are not required to make their decisions 
concerning 'efficiency and economy' and 
'adequacy1 with the greatest degree of precision. 
Nevertheless, the bottom line of the federal 
statutory standard, the substantive limit placed 
by Congress upon the state, is that rates must be 
sufficient to compensate efficiently and econo-
mically operated providers for the necessary 
costs they incur in providing required care to 
their residents. 
(Emphasis added). Id_. at 909. It is submitted that the State of 
Utah, through its Department of Health, clearly exceeded the 
"substantive limitation" imposed by the federal statute. 
The hearing officer steadfastly refused to consider the 
very indicia of the State's compliance with the "substantive 
limitations" already pointed out, i.e., the costs, the 
"efficiencies" and "economies" of Weber Memorial Care Center. 
In order for the state agency to have made proper 
"assurances" to the federal government, it is apparent that 
examination of actual providers and actual facilities was 
required. As already mentioned, that did not occur. It is clear 
that the assurances made were but bald assertions based on the 
language of the regulations, but without substance in fact. 
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Therefore, until the state plan meets those requirements, it is 
defective and should be declared invalid. See, e.g., Nebraska 
Health Care Association v. Dunning, supra; Hillhaven Corp. v, 
Wisconsin Dept. of Health, supra. This Court should recognize 
the refusal of the judicial system of the this state to date, to 
bring these facts to light and to recognize them as such. 
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found, a 
provider plaintiff does have a right to have its claim heard on 
the merits, and to receive a judicial determination as to whether 
"the actions and non-action of the State . . . violate the 
standard set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A)." Coos Bay Care 
Center v. State of Oregon, Department of Human Resources, 803 F.2d 
1060, 1063, (9th Cir. 1986). That is all that is sought here. 
II 
EVEN IF THE UTAH STATE PLAN IS NOT INVALID PER SE, 
THE HEARING OFFICER'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW WEBER MEMORIAL 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF ITS COSTS 
AND TO PROVE IT IS AN EFFICIENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY 
OPERATED FACILITY WAS CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE 
FEDERAL STATUTE AND REGULATIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 
Keeping in mind the thrust of the Boren Amendment, that 
efficiently and economically operated facilities are to have their 
costs met, Weber Memorial, feeling that it qualified under that 
standard and yet was not having its costs met, sought a hearing 
before a hearing officer appointed by the Utah State Department of 
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Health. As already described earlier, when Weber Memorial was 
finally able to receive its hearing, it was totally precluded from 
producing evidence which would have demonstrated that it met the 
very objective of the statute. 
As one court recently explained: 
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) was amended October 
1, 1980, the change, known as the Boren Amendment, 
expressly reflects an emphasis in reimbursement 
to that which is reasonable and adequate to meet 
a cost incurred by a facility in order to conform 
to applicable state and federal laws and regula-
tions. Therefore, . . . the new Boren Amendment 
requires full and current reimbursement of actual 
expenditures incurred by facilities. As well, it 
prohibits any device utilized by a state to lower 
reimbursement, other than that authorized by 
statute. 
(Emphasis added). Geriatrics, Inc. v. Colorado Department of 
Social Services, 712 P.2d 1035, 1039, (Colo. App. 1985). Thus, 
the Court recognized that the intent of the law is to reimburse 
facilities for "actual expenditures incurred" as long as those 
expenditures are made in order to conform to applicable law, and 
assuming the facility is efficiently and economically operated. 
Indeed, the law requires that "the rate in fact must be reasonable 
and adequate within the meaning of the statute." Hillcrest Corp. 
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, supra. 634 F.Supp. at 1318, citing 
42 C.F.R. § 447.252(a) (1982). In this case, the preliminary 
ruling of the hearing officer referred to earlier speaks for 
itself. Several months prior to the hearing, he effectively 
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closed the door to the evidence most crucial to Weber Memorial's 
case. Indeed, the transcript of the hearing is replete with 
examples of how the hearing officer's ruling effectively denied 
Weber Memorial an opportunity for a fair hearing. See, Excerpts 
from Transcript of Formal Hearing, Hearing held August 3, 1984, 
before Brian L. Farr, Administrative Law Judge, Addendum. 
Plaintiff was effectively denied an opportunity to prove that the 
rate "in fact" was not "reasonable and adequate" to meet its costs 
"within the meaning of the statute." 
It is a fundamental principle of due process that a 
party appearing before an administrative body is entitled to a 
fair hearing, including the opportunity to be heard at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner. The effect of the hearing 
officer's ruling, as well as the District Court's affirmance 
thereof, is to deny Weber Memorial a meaningful and fair hearing 
on the central issue of the entire statutory scheme. 
Thus, while the hearing officer certainly had the 
authority under his fact-finding powers to find that Weber 
Memorial was not jln^  fact an efficiently and economically operated 
facility, or that it was jLn_ fact having its costs met, etc., he 
refused to even take any evidence on those issues. In essence, 
Weber Memorial has never had its day in court. 
A participant provider in the Medicaid system no doubt 
has a property interest in achieving or enforcing its rights under 
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that system. See, e.g., Bowens v. North Carolina Department of 
Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1983). The question in 
this case, insofar as the Constitution is concerned, is what type 
of hearing is required. The particular type of hearing "must be 
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to 
be heard." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970). 
In this case, the only way Weber Memorial can be heard 
in a meaningful manner is to permit it to demonstrate its costs 
and to submit evidence concerning the efficiencies. Weber 
Memorials's witnesses would, of course, be fully subject to cross 
examination. It is only by permitting this kind of evidence, 
focused upon the individual provider, that the circuitous logic of 
the State, (that the rate is the definition of efficiently and 
economically operated and that the only way to be considered 
efficiently and economically operated is to have costs below the 
flat rate), can be broken. 
Petitioners seek a remand to the hearing officer for a 
true evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioners, given the 
guidelines which the Court will hopefully provide concerning the 
requirements of federal law, will receive the opportunity to prove 
that Weber Memorial is an efficiently and economically operated 
facility and yet is not having its costs met under the Utah State 
Medicaid Plan. 
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I l l 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED 
A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD TO THE AGENCY'S 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
There is one final point to be made concerning the 
standard of review in this case. In reviewing the Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Fishier (Addendum-18) and the Final Judgment by 
Judge Daniels (Addendum-19), it is evident tha the District Coutt 
applied a deferential standard to the review of the Executive 
Director's decision with its incorporation of the Hearing 
Officer's findings and recommendations. Apparently, the District 
Court felt constrained by UCA § 26-23-1(3) to rule in favor of the 
State if the Executive Director's "final determination was sup-
ported by a residuum of legally admissible evidence in the record 
and was not arbitrary and capricious." As pointed out at length 
already, Petitioners submit that the record does not support the 
prior determination even as adjudged by the deferential standard. 
However, the District Court's ruling is fundamentally flawed for 
another reason. An Appellate Court is never required to defer to 
an agency ruling on questions of law and on rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence. The cryptic decision of the District 
Judges below, on their face, reflect a failure to recognize the 
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appropriate standard of review on these questions. Furthermore, 
this Court certainly has the inherent authority to review and 
correct erroneous rulings of law without any deference to either 
the agency's findings and conclusions or the District Court's 
erroneous determination• 
As stated in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of 
Employment, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah, 1982): 
In administrative cases, our scope of review of 
an agency's decision as to legal questions and 
questions of mixed law and fact is generally 
broader than our scope of review of questions of 
fact. On most questions of statutory construc-
tion, with some exceptions, our review is plenary 
with no deference accorded the administrative 
determination. 
(Emphasis added). See, also, Madison v. Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game, 696 P.1d 168 (Alaska 1985) (issues of statutory inter-
pretation and whether administrative board acted within its 
statutory authority "fall into the realm of special competency of 
the courts;" statutory interpretation of the words "customary and 
raditional" at issue); Gardiner v. Arizona Department of Economic 
Security, 623 P.2d 33, 36 (Ariz. App. 1980) ("court may substitute 
its judgment for the agency's conclusions regarding the legal 
effect of [the] facts"); International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, Local 1357 v. Hawaiian Telephone Co., 713 P.2d 943 
(Hawaii 1986) (agency's legal conclusions are freely reviewable by 
the courts); Dangerfield v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 694 P.2d 
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439 (Kan. 1985) (questions of law are always open to review by 
courts); Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 637 P.2d 567, 569 (N.M. 
1981) (Court "may correct the [administrative] decision-maker's 
misapplication of the law"); Clarke v. Shoreline School District 
No. 412, King County, 720 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1986) (reviewing court 
reviews the issues of law de novo). 
In this case, then, because a resolution of this case 
requires an interpretation of the "Boren Amendment", 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) and the implementing federal regulations, the 
District Court erred in applying a deferential standard. This 
Court may then interpret the statute <de_ novo in arriving at its 
decision. Additionally, since the refusal to permit the 
introduction of the evidence regarding Petitioner's costs and 
efficiencies, as discussed previously, was clerarly prejudicial to 
Petitioners' case, as appears on the record, Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blakeney Corporation, 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah) 1978), and was 
contrary to the underlying purpose and intent of the governing 
statute, this Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Weber Memorial respectfully 
requests that the Court declare the State of Utah Medicaid Plan, 
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and particularly the "flat rate" aspect thereof, invalid. 
Alternatively, Petitioners simply seek the opportunity to submit 
evidence before a hearing officer demonstrating that Weber 
Memorial is an efficiently and economically operated facility 
within the meaning of the federal law, but that it is not having 
its costs met within the flat rate. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was really not 
responsive to the points raised here and, with all due respect, 
seemed to ignore the principal issues. The Court of Appeals took 
a benign view of the system, stating, in effect, that if the Utah 
plan met most of the providers' needs, then Weber Memorial, not 
the State, must be out of line. That facile conclusion is exactly 
what the Petitioners wish to refute by the production of evidence. 
Common sense would indicate that the earth is flat; evidence would 
allow that notion to be dispelled. Please let this provider have 
its day in court. 
DATED this /S^7 day of April, 1988. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
LOJEK & HALL, CTD. 
Donald W. Loj ek 
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TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. 
and Chartham Management, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Finamiiiq, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860342-CA 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Davidson. 
D 
BENCH, Judge: C&eritoittieCcvrt 
I**** Com ct *wxm 
If 
Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment of a trial court 
affirming the final determination of the executive director of 
the Utah Department of Health (Department). We affirm. 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(1983), commonly referred to as the Medicaid Act, establishes d 
cooperative relationship in which the federal and state 
governments share the costs of medical services to the needy, 
a state elects to participate, it must establish a state plan 
which complies with statutory and regulatory requirements under 
the Medicaid Act. Prior to 1980, states participating in the 
Medicaid program were required to reimburse health care providers 
for their "reasonable costs." Typically, a provider would submit 
an accounting of its costs to the Department. The Department 
would then review these costs on a case by case, charge by charge 
basis and reimburse those costs deemed reasonable. In 1980, 
Congress amended the Medicaid Act to allow a flat rate system of 
reimbursement. Subsection 1396(a)(13)(A), commonly referred to 
as the Boren Amendment, now provides: 
A State plan for medical assistance must 
provide for payment . . . of the hospital, 
skilled nursing facility, and intermediate 
care facility services provided under the 
plan through the use of rates (determined 
in accordance with methods and standards 
developed by the State 1 which the 
State finds, and makes assurances 
satisfactory to the Secretary, are 
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
which must be incurred by efficiently and 
economically operated facilities in order 
to provide care and services in conformity 
with applicable State and Federal laws, 
regulations, and quality and safety 
standards . . • . 
Defendant Department is the state agency responsible for 
administering the Medicaid program in Utah, In 1981, in 
response to the Boren Amendment and the urging of the Utah 
Health Care Association, the state legislature directed the 
Department to organize a committee to develop and propose a 
flat rate plan for reimbursement under the Medicaid program. 
Under the plan proposed by the committee, patients who qualify 
for Medicaid assistance are classified according to the degree 
of care needed. The health care provider is then paid a 
statewide flat rate fee per patient per day according to the 
classification of such patient. The flat rate is modified by a 
"property differential," unique to each provider, to account 
for wide variations in property costs. The flat rate is also 
adjusted annually to account for inflation and other factors. 
The proposed plan was submitted through the statutory 
rulemaking process. A public hearing was held, and no 
objection was voiced from the health care industry. The plan 
was then submitted to the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services which certified that the plan satisfied all 
requirements of the law and that all assurances submitted under 
the requirements of the Medicaid Act were acceptable. The 
modified flat rate plan became effective July 1, 1981. 
Plaintiff Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. (Weber Memorial) 
is a long-term health care provider. In September 1981, Weber 
Memorial acquired the subject facility from Weber County. 
Plaintiff Chartham Management, Inc. manages the facility 
pursuant to a contract with Weber Memorial. In 1983, Weber 
Memorial requested a hearing before the Department to challenge 
the application of the modified flat rate plan and the 
classification of patients. Prior to the hearing, the 
Department filed a motion asking the hearing officer to rule, 
as a matter of law, that the state plan did not violate federal 
law and that the plan did not require an examination of Weber 
Memorial's costs nor a determination whether this particular 
facility is efficiently and economically operated. The hearing 
officer granted the Department's motion. Consequently, at the 
administrative hearing which commenced August 3, 1984, Weber 
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Memorial was not permitted to introduce evidence of its costs 
nor attempt to prove it is efficiently and economically 
operated. 
In his proposed findings, conclusions, and decision, the 
hearing officer concluded the modified flat rate plan complied 
with all provisions of federal and state law, and the 
Department did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary 
to law in the development, implementation, and operation of the 
plan. The executive director of the Department adopted the 
hearing officer's findings in her final determination dated 
June 4, 1985. Weber Memorial filed a petition for review in 
the Third District Court.1 In a memorandum decision and 
final judgment, the trial court affirmed, finding "the 
Executive Director's final determination was supported fay H 
residuum of legally admissible evidence in the record and was 
not arbitrary or capricious." Weber Memorial appeals from the 
trial court's final judgment. 
When a trial court reviews an administrative decision and 
the court's judgment is challenged on appeal, this Court 
reviews the administrative decision as if the appeal had come 
directly from the agency. Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah 
Securities Division, 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987). Therefore, 
it is not necessary to address Weber Memorial's contention that 
the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. When 
reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of general 
questions of law, including acts of Congress, "this Court 
applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to 
the expertise of the [agency]." Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 60R (Utah 1981). 
On appeal, Weber Memorial first argues that contrary to the 
executive director's final determination, the modified flat 
rate plan does not comply with federal law and regulations. 
Section 1396(a)(13)(A) requires the state to find that the 
rates, which are to be determined by methods and standards 
developed by the state, reasonably and adequately meet the 
1. Under the new Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-l through -21 (1987) (effective January 1, 1988), the 
district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency action resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings, while the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, as 
designated by statute, has jurisdiction to review all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
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costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities. The 
state must also make satisfactory assurances to the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services. Weber Memorial 
contends the Department failed to make the necessary findings 
and assurances that the rates satisfy the statutory 
requirements. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.253 (1985); Marv Washington 
Hospital, Inc. v. Fisher, 635 F.Supjp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985) 
(federal law does not require written findings). 
The committee organized by the Department consisted of a 
representative from the legislature, a legislative analyst, the 
president and executive director of the Utah Health Care 
Association, and a nursing home operator. Prior to selecting 
the modified flat rate plan, the committee considered several 
alternative methods of reimbursement. The committee based its 
rate determinations on 1) the most recent information on the 
actual costs being incurred by the nursing home industry in the 
aggregate, as reported by each facility on its 1980 "facility 
cost profile"; 2) a comparison with the rates paid by other 
states in the region; 3) input from the Utah Health Care 
Association; 4) a trending factor on the historical costs as 
recommended by a consulting firm retained by the state; 5) a 
comparison with 1976 rates, as adjusted for inflation; 6) the 
legislative budget allocation;2 and 7) discussions and 
interactions between committee members. Pursuant to statute, 
the Department submitted to the Secretary of the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services its assurances that the 
rate reasonably and adequately meets the costs of efficiently 
and economically operated facilities. The Secretary certified 
the assurances as satisfactory. 
A reasonable basis existed for the Department to find the 
proposed rates were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
of an efficiently and economically operated facility. 
Ninety-three percent of all long-term health care facilities in 
Utah were shown to be meeting their costs under the modified 
flat rate plan, with a majority showing a profit. We conclude 
the Department developed reasonable methods and standards to 
determine the rates. The modified flat rate plan therefore 
complies with federal law. 
2. Weber Memorial claims the rates were based to an 
impermissible extent on the budget factor. The budget 
allocation was clearly only one of several factors considered 
by the committee. 
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Weber Memorial next argues that, even if the modified flat 
rate plan is valid, the hearing officer erred in refusing to 
allow Weber Memorial to submit evidence of its costs and proof 
of its efficient and economic operation. Prior to the hearing, 
the Department filed a motion to exclude as irrelevant all 
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation. The hearing 
officer granted the motion. Weber Memorial claims the hearing 
officer's ruling was contrary to l»w and a denial of its right 
to a fair hearing. 
Utah r\Mi^ Anu. Jj 26-23-2(1) (1987) states: 
In any such hearing, the hearing officer 
shall have authority to administer oaths, 
examine witnesses, and issue in the name 
of the department notice of the hearings 
or subpoenas requiring the testimony of 
witnesses and the production of evidence 
relevant to any matter in the hearing. 
Utah Admin. Code R455-14 M M n X i W O (Da'-1') a l s o provides: 
The rules of evidence as applied in civil 
actions in the courts of this State shall 
be generally followed in the hearings. 
Any relevant evidence may be admitted if 
it is the type of evidence commonly relied 
upon by prudent men in the conduct of 
their affairs- . . . Irrelevant, 
immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence 
shall be excluded. 
In his proposed findings, the hearing officer explained his 
ruling: 
The State Plan does not contain a specific 
definition of what it means to be 
"efficiently and economically operated." 
Rather, the State has set rates for 
payment for services that the State deems 
are reasonable and adequate and maintains 
that an "efficiently and economically 
operated facility" is one that is able to 
operate at or below that standard. Such 
approach is proper under current law. 
In explanations accompanying 
regulations of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, the Department 
states: 
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We have also decided not to mandate 
that the State plan specifically 
provide a definition of an 
"efficiently and economically 
operated facility." The reason for 
this is that the State's methods and 
standards implicitly act as the 
State's definition of an efficiently 
and economically operated facility, 
and no explicit definition is 
necessary. 
Because the "Modified Flat Rate" is 
applied uniformly statewide, and is the 
standard by which all nursing homes are 
measured, it was not necessary to examine 
the specific costs of Weber Memorial Care 
Center, Inc. to determine if it could be 
more efficiently and economically operated 
and that was not done. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3) (1987) states, "If the final 
determination of the executive director is consistent with the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by the 
hearing officer, the court shall review the record and may 
alter the final determination only upon a finding that the 
final determination is capricious, or not supported by the 
evidence." The executive director, in sustaining the hearing 
officer, found that since the modified flat rate implicitly 
defines an efficiently and economically operated facility, 
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation was irrelevant 
and, therefore, inadmissible. We conclude the executive 
director's final determination on this issue was not 
capricious, but supported by the evidence. 
Weber Memorial last argues the classification of patients 
under the modified flat rate plan is capricious. Under the 
plan, a health care provider routinely submits recommendations 
for patient classifications to the Department. Department 
officials consider these recommendations and other information 
supplied by the providers in making final classifications. 
Weber Memorial contends the Department arbitrarily classified 
thirty-eight of its patients as "intermediate" rather than 
"skilled care." Skilled care patients, by definition, require 
more specialized care and receive a higher rate of 
reimbursement. 
Requests for reconsideration of patient classifications are 
routinely granted by the Department, but Weber Memorial 
presented no evidence that such requests were made for the 
860342-CA 6 
thirty-eight patients. Weber Memorial also failed to present 
any evidence that the thirty-eight patients qualified as 
skilled care patients, The only evidence Weber Memorial 
presented in support of its claim is that the national 
percentage of skilled care patients is higher than Utah's, 
Such evidence is insufficient to convince this Court that the 
state classification system is capricious. Section 26-23-2(3). 
In conclusion, the modified flat rate plan for Medicaid 
reimbursement is in full compliance with federal and state 
law. The final determination of the executive director was not 
capricious, but amply supported by the evidence. The final 
judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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tH. 1 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 4 ? § 1396a 
h 1396a , State plans lor medical assistame. 
(a) Contents 
A State plan tor medical assistance must— 
42 § 1396a PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
any such care and services furnished any individual for which payment 
would otherwise be made to the State with respect to him under section 
1396b of this title; 
(12) provide that, in determining whether an individual is blind. 
there shall be an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of 
the eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select; 
(13) provide— 
(A) for payment (except uhcrc the State agenc> is subject to an 
order under section 1396m of this title) of the hospital, skilled 
nursing facility, and tntermec ate care facility services provided 
under the plan through the use of rates (determined in accordance 
with methods and standards developed by the State and which, in 
the case of hospitals, take into account the situation of hospitals 
which serve a disproportionate number of low income patients 
with special needs and provide, in the case of hospital patients re-
ceiving services at an inappropriate level of care (under conditions 
similar to those described in section 1395x(v)(lXG) of this title), 
for lower reimbursement rates reflecting the level of care actual!) 
received (in a manner consistent with section 1395x(v)(l)(G) of 
this title) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory 
to the Secreiar). are reasonable and adequau to meet the cosn 
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated 
facilities in order to provide care and services in conformit} with 
applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and 
safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical 
assistance have reasonable access (taking into account geographic 
location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient hospital services 
of adequate quality: and such State makes further assurances, sat-
isfactory to the Secretary, for the filing of uniform cost reports b\ 
each hospital, skilled nursing facility, and intermediate care facilit) 
and periodic audits by the State of such report and 
(IS) 
1 QftA AMFNDMFNT *A* *** W " * n t (except where the State ageocv it subject to an order 
X7QH tUUtliULl&isi
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intermediate care facility services provided wider the plan through the use 
of rates (determined in accordance wi'h methods and standards developed 
by the Slate and which, in the ease of hospitals, take iato e-count the 
situation of hospitals which serve a disjiropoflionat* number of low income 
patienU with special oeeds and provide, in the ca»c of hospital patients 
receiving services at an inappropriate levei of care (under conditions similar 
to those described in section 1895x(vKlKG) of this title), for lower reim-
bursement rates reflecting the level of care actually received (in a manner 
consistent with section 1395x(vXlKG) of this title) which the State finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary', are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economi-
cally operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity 
with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety 
standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have 
reasonable access (taking into account geographic location and reasonable 
travel time) to inpatient hospital service* of adequate quality; and such 
State makes further assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the f»l:nr 
of uniform cost reports by each ho?;>iu.\ skilled nursing facility, and 
A n n r M n u M - "I - intermediate cart facility and periodic aub.ts b> tne Suu- of r-uch rtpons; 
Haalth Core Pinoncing Administration, NHS 
42 CHt Ch. IV (10-145 Mrfiofi) 
140 F* SS680. Dec. 3. 1981:47 FR S567, Mar. 
2.1982. as amended at 4S FR 6*057. Dec 19. 19831 
Subpart C—Payment for Inpatient 
Hatpitof and Ung-Term Cart Facil-
ity Services 
SOUSCX: 46 FR 47971. 8ept. SO. 1981. 
unless otherwise noted. 
1447.250 Basis and purpose. 
Ca) This subpart implements section 
1902(s)(13)(A) of the Act. which re-
quires that the State plan provide for 
payment for hospital and long-term 
care facility services through the use 
of rates that the. State finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the 
Secretary, are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs that must be 
incurred by efficiently and economi-
cally operated facilities to provide 
services in conformity with State and 
Federal laws, regulations, and quality 
and safety standards. 
<b) Section 447.253(a)(2) implements 
section 1902(a)(30) of the Act. which 
requires that payments be consistent 
with efficiency, economy, and quaJjty 
of care; 
(c) Section 447.271 implements sec-
tion 1903(JK3) of the Act. which re-
quires that payments for inpatient 
hospital services not exceed the hospi-
tal's customary charges. 
Cd) Section 447.280 implements sec-
tion 1913(b) of the Act. which con-
cerns reimbursement for long-term 
care services furnished by swing-bed 
hospitals. 
C4S FR 58057. Dec. 19.19831 
I447.XS2 State plan requirements. 
(a) The plan must provide that the 
requirements of this subpart are met. 
<b) The plan must specify compre-
hensively the methods and standards 
used by the aaency to set payment 
rates In a manner consistent with 45 
CFR 301.2. 
(c) If the aaency chooses to apply 
the cost limits established under Medi-
care Csee f 405.460 of this chapter) on 
an individual provider basis, the plan 
must specify this requirement. 
(Approved by the Office of Management 
and Budget under control number 0938-9193) 
I4S FR 9S0SS. Dec. 19.1983) 
- 2 -
i447Jt$3 (Hliir requirement*. 
(a) State assurances. In order to re-
ceive HCFA approval of a significant -
State plan change in payment meth-
ods and standards, the Medicaid 
agency must make assurances satisfac-
tory to HCFA that the requirements 
aet forth in paragraphs (b) through 
<g) of this section are being met, must 
submit the related information re-
quired by 1447.255 of this subpart, 
and must comply with all other re-
quirements of this subpart. 
<b) Findings. Whenever the Medic-
aid agency makes a significant change 
in its methods and standards, but not 
less often than annually, the agency 
must make the following findings 
(1) Payment rales, (i) The Medicaid 
agency pays for inpatient hospital 
services and long-term care facility 
services through the use of rates that 
are reasonable and adequate to meet 
the costs that must be incurred by ef-
ficiently and economically operated 
providers «io provide services in con-
formity with applicable State and Fed-
eral laws, regulations, and quality and 
safety standards. 
(ii) With respect to inpatient hospi-
tal services— 
(A) The methods and standards used 
to determine payment rates take into 
account the situation of hospitals 
which serve a disproportionate 
number of low income patients with 
special needs. 
(B) The methods and standards used 
to determine payment rates provide 
that reimbursement for hospital pa-
tients receiving services at an inappro-
priate level of care under conditions 
similar to those described in section 
M6HVX1XG) of the Act will be made 
at lower rates, reflecting the level of 
care actually received, in a manner 
consistent with section 1S61(VK1KC); 
and 
<C) The payment rates are adequate 
to assure that recipients have reasona-
ble access, taking into account geo-
graphic location and reasonable travel 
time, to inpatient hospital services of 
adequate quality. 
(2) Upper.limits. The Medicaid agen-
cy's estimated average proposed pay-
ment rate is reasonably expected to 
pay no more in the aggregate for inpa-
tient hospital services or long-term 
care facility services than the amount 
that the agency reasonably estimates 
would be paid for the services under 
the Medicare principles of reimburse-
ment. 
I4IFH479"] Sfl i H 196i U Fh MU3 
Hov. 4. 1981] 
§447.252 SUtU plftn requirements. 
<a) The plan must provide that the 
requirements of this subpart are met. 
(b) The plan must specify compre-
hensively the methods and standards 
used by the agency to set payment 
rates in a manner consistent with 45 
CFR 201.2. 
(c) If the agency chooses to apply 
the cost limits established under Medi-
care (see 1405.460 of this chapter) on 
an individual provider basis, the plan 
must specify this requirement 
(Approved by the Office of Management 
and Budget under control number 0936-
0193) 
(48 FR 54058. Dec. 19. 19831 
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JUDGE 
The Court havinn hparri argumpnt of counsel, reviewed the record and Memoranda on 
file herein, and heing fullv advised in the prpmisps. finds that thp conduct of thp 
State of Utah in establishing its modified flat rate plan of reimbursement for health 
care providers was reasonable and adequate. Thp Court finds that the State of 
Utah did not base its decision solely on budgetary constraints. Lastly, the Court 
determines that the derision nf the Administrative law Judge was supported hy 
sufficient evidence. 
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Fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accord with this Decision. 
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Adminis tra t ive .- ...^ge made o u n m v * f ind ings of f a c t and 
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Execut ive Director of the Otah Health Department i s sued o I lual 
determinat ion c o n s i s t e n t with the Findings of Fact and 
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review of the recor< t o determine 
whether the f i n a j - agency "capric ious , or not 
supported Dy the evidence. amended 
supported by the evidence," OCA 26-23-2(3) (1953, as amended 
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